In this paper we studied the two widely used encryption schemes to perform symmetric encryption for a huge number of concurrent clients in high-speed networks applications. The current schemes consume either plenty of memory to gain high throughput or low memory with low throughput. The need has aroused for a scheme that has low memory requirements and in the same time possesses high speed, as the number of the internet users increases each day. We used the SSM model (El-Fotouh and Diepold, 2008) , to construct an encryption scheme based on the AES. The proposed scheme possesses high throughput together with low memory requirements. We performed theoretical and practical analyses for the existing and proposed schemes.
INTRODUCTION
The number of internet users is increasing continually world wide. Recent statistics reported the current number of internet users is more than 1.24 billion. This number has increased more than 290 % in the last seven years and is still increasing daily (Stats, 2008) . Consequently, internet and network applications need to serve an increasing number of concurrent clients. The enhanced quality and performance of internet and modern applications require more bandwidth capacity to fullfill the clients' needs. Today, modern networks do not only have to fulfill the demand of higher transmission rates but also have to provide and to guarantee data security and especially data confidentiality (Jung et al., 2001) .
The encryption and decryption key setup latencies are particularly important in applications where only several blocks of data are encrypted between two consecutive key changes. IPSec (Kent and Atkinson, 1998a; Kent and Atkinson, 1998b; Kent and Atkinson, 1998c) and ATM (Dunn and Martin, 2000) , with small sizes of packets, and consecutive packets encrypted using different keys, are two widespread protocols in which the key setup latencies may play a very important role (Gaj and Chodowiec, 1999) .
Ciphers that require subkeys pre-computation have a lower key agility due to the pre-computation time, and they also require extra RAM to hold the pre-computed subkeys. This RAM requirement does not exist in the implementations of encryption algorithms, which compute their subkeys during the encryption/decryption operation "on-the-fly" (Sklavos et al., 2005) .
On October 2, 2000 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that Rijndael (Daemen and Rijmen, 1998) has been chosen to become the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and it was announced as a standard in (NIST, 2001) . Rijndael supports on-the-fly subkeys computation for encryption, but it requires a onetime execution of the key schedule to generate all subkeys prior to the first decryption with a specific key. This places a slight resource burden on the key agility of Rijndael (Schneier et al., ) .
In this paper, we studied the two widely used schemes for generating the cipher's subkeys in network applications. The first scheme uses subkeys pre-computation and the second uses on-the-fly subkeys computation. We performed theoretical and experimental analyses on both schemes. Our analyses pointed out some shortcomes in both schemes, as the scheme that uses on-the-fly subkeys computation is considered slow, on the other hand the scheme that uses subkeys pre-computation uses more memory, which may limit the number of concurrent clients and is more subjected to cache misses and page faults.
To overcome the shortcomes of both schemes, we proposed a new scheme. Our scheme is based on the Static Substitution Model (SSM) (El-Fotouh and Diepold, 2008 ). The SSM model can provide a block cipher with a secondary key. The secondary key is used to replace some bits of the cipher's expanded key. We used the SSM model to construct a variant of the AES, we named this variant AESS. We used AESS to construct an encryption scheme for network applications. In the proposed scheme, each client possesses two keys. The first key is shared with a group of clients (a cluster) and it is expanded in memory (cluster key). The second key is the client's unique session key. Encryption and decryption are done using AESS, where the cluster key is used as the expanded AES key and the client's session key is used as the secondary key. Our proposed scheme enjoys high throughput together with low memory consumption.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the current encryption schemes together with our general assumptions. In section 3 we propose a variant of the AES and present our proposed encryption scheme for networks applications. In section 4 we present the memory analysis of the schemes. In section 5 present a simulation to help us better understand the behavior of the schemes in real systems. In section 6 we present the security analysis of the schemes. We conclude in section 7.
CURRENT SCHEMES

General Assumptions
Assumptions:
1. We have a Server that serves N (large/huge number) of concurrent secure sessions.
2. Each client has a unique random session key of size 256-bits and a unique random initial vector (IV) of size 128-bits. .
3.
We are going to use the AES (with 256-bits key) for encryption and decryption.
4. For decryption, we are going to use the Equivalent Inverse Cipher of AES (Daemen and Rijmen, 1998) , that has the same sequence of transformations as AES, thus offers a more efficient structure than the normal Inverse Cipher (NIST, 2001 ) and is used in many optimized software and hardware systems (Gladman, 2006; Lai et al., 2004; Li and Li, 2005; Tillich and Groschdl, 2006) .
5. The encryption/decryption is done in CBC mode (Menezes et al., 1996) , which is used by most network applications (Tan et al., 2004; Walker, 2000) .
Scheme 1
Scheme 1 is a speed dedicated scheme, where the expanded key for encryption and decryption for each session are computed at the start of that session, stored in memory and then recalled whenever an encryption or decryption operation for that session is needed. It executes as follows:
• Setup Routine: is executed for every client number i (C i ), once it is connected: -A unique cryptographic random key (K i ) of length 256-bits and a random (IV i ) of length 128-bits are generated and sent to the client. -K i is expanded, using AES key setup algorithm to produce the client's encryption expanded subkeys (E i ) and the client's decryption expanded subkeys (D i ). Note that both E i and D i are of size 1920-bits. -E i , D i and IV i are stored in memory.
• Encryption Execution Routine: To encrypt a plaintext (PT) for C i : -E i and IV i are fetched from memory and are used to encrypt PT using CBC mode.
• Decryption Execution Routine: To decrypt a ciphertext (CT) for C i : -D i and IV i are fetched from memory and is used to decrypt CT using CBC mode.
Scheme 2
Scheme 2 is a memory dedicated scheme, where the subkeys for encryption and decryption are computed on-the-fly, whenever an encryption or decryption operation is needed. It executes as follows:
• Setup Routine: is executed for every client C i , once it is connected: -A unique cryptographic random key (K i ) of length 256-bits and a random (IV i ) of length 128-bits are generated and sent to the client. -K i and IV i are stored in memory.
-Encryption Execution Routine: To encrypt a plaintext (PT) for C i : * K i and IV i are fetched from memory. * PT is encrypted using K i , where the encryption subkeys are computed on-the-fly, and IV i using CBC mode. -Decryption Execution Routine: To decrypt a ciphertext (CT) for C i : * K i and IV i are fetched from memory. * CT is decrypted using K i , where the decryption subkeys are computed on-the-fly, and IV i using CBC mode.
3 PROPOSED SCHEME
The Requirements of Encryption
Schemes for High-Speed Networks 1-High Throughput. The faster the encryption the better.
2-Low Memory. The less memory requirements the better.
3-Maximum Number of Clients. The more served clients the better.
Motivation
Scheme2 satisfies all these requirements except the most important one (high throughput), on the other hand Scheme1 can not serve a large number of concurrent clients (see Section 5). A need for a scheme that satisfies all the requirements has aroused.
Proposed Scheme Objectives
1. High Throughput: It should be faster than Scheme2 and possesses a comparable performance as that of Scheme1.
Low memory:
The memory requirements should be comparable to that of Scheme 2.
3. Maximum number of clients: The maximum number of concurrent clients should be comparable to that of Scheme2.
Refer to Section 5 for more details.
AESS
AESS is a variant of AES with 256-bits key. It is constructed using the SSM model (El-Fotouh and Diepold, 2008) . It accepts two 128-bits secondary keys. The listing of AESS is found in table 1, where:
X: is the input plaintext, that will be encrypted using AESS.
EK: is the expanded AES encryption key.
K1: is the first part of the secondary key of size 128-bits.
K2: is the second part of the secondary key of size 128-bits.
Substitute(EK,K1,i): replaces the i th 128-bits of EK with K1 (Note that: the first round of the AES is round zero and it is the pre-whitening process). Encrypt-AESS(X,EK,K1,K2) Substitute(EK,K1,5) Substitute(EK,K2,10) C=Encrypt-AES(X,EK) return C Encrypt-AES(X,EK): encrypts X (using AES encryption routine with 256-bits key), with EK as the expanded encryption key and return the result. C: the output ciphertext.
In AESS, two rounds subkey are replaced:
1. The subkeys of the fifth round are replaced with K1.
2. The subkeys of the tenth round are replaced with K2.
SchemeS n
We propose to use AESS to build a scheme for highspeed networks, where:
• (K c ) is the cluster key used as the AES secret key, and is shared by n clients (where n is the size of a cluster).
• Each client i (C i ) has its own two unique 128-bits keys (C k1 i ) and (C k2 i ). SchemeS n tries to eliminate the key setup latency, it executes as follows:
• Cluster Setup Routine: is used to prepare the system and is executed once for each cluster of n-clients.
-A cryptographic secure shared random key (K c ) with length 256-bits is generated. -K c is expanded, using AES key setup algorithm to produce the cluster's shared encryption expanded subkeys (E c ) and the cluster's shared decryption expanded subkeys (D c ). -E c and D c are stored in the server's memory.
• Client Setup Routine: is executed for every client number i (C i ), once it is connected: -Three unique cryptographic 128-bits random numbers C k1 i , C k2 i and IV i are generated and sent to the client together with K c . -C k1 i , C k2 i and IV i are stored in the server's memory.
• Encryption Execution Routine: To encrypt a plaintext (PT) for C i : -C k1 i , C k2 i and IV i are fetched from the server's memory.
-PT is encrypted with AESS, where E c , C k1 i , C k2 i serve as EK, K1 and K2 respectively defined in table 1 and IV i is used as the initial vector for the CBC mode.
• Decryption Execution Routine: To decrypt a ciphertext (CT) for C i :
-C k1 i , C k2 i and IV i are fetched from the server's memory.
-CT is decrypted with the decryption routine of AESS using D c , C k1 i , C k2 i as EK, K1 and K2 respectively defined in table 1 and IV i is used as the initial vector for the CBC mode.
MEMORY ANALYSIS
The less the memory the scheme needs, the more available memory to other applications and the larger the number of concurrent clients the server can serve. Memory access has a great role in the overall scheme performance. If a server has insufficient physical memory space to cache all of the data necessary for the execution of its local threads, it has to perform page replacements for data not located on physical memory. Although the technology of virtual memory makes the server able to complete the work of its local threads, the latency of memory accesses caused by page replacements postpones the execution of those threads. This factor currently becomes more important to program performance since the cost of disk accesses is very expensive compared to the cost of data computation (Liang et al., 2003) . Table 2 presents the memory requirements in bits of each scheme per client to hold the key material.
For scheme1:
• The AES Equivalent Inverse Cipher uses different subkeys for decryption than those for encryption, except for the first and last round. That is why we need to store only 3584-bits instead of 3840-bits.
For scheme2:
• 256-bits are needed for encryption/decryption to hold the intermediate round subkeys, as not to overwrite the key itself.
• In case both encryption and decryption are needed, 512-bits are required to hold the intermediate values of encryption and decryption round keys, to allow simultaneous encryption and decryption operations to take place.
For SchemeS n :
• 256-bits are needed for encryption/decryption to hold C k1 i and C k2 i for the client C i . • In case of encryption: an expanded key is required for each n clients.
• In case of decryption: an expanded key is required for each n clients.
• As n increases the overhead of storing the cluster expanded key decreases.
SIMULATION ANALYSIS
In order to gain more insight on the practical behavior of the schemes, we designed a simulation program to explore the schemes properties. We ran the simulation with different parameters to investigate their influence on each scheme. This simulation analysis is intended to demonstrate the performance and behavior of the schemes. We have developed four scenarios that can model various classes of network applications, these scenarios are:
Scenario 1: models network applications that do not use disk operations (e.g. a chat server, where the encrypted packets are transmitted from client to another).
Scenario 2: models network applications that read form the disk (e.g. a query server, where the client sends a query and receives the results).
Scenario 3: models network applications that write to the disk (e.g. a database server, where the data sent by the client is stored in the database).
Scenario 4: models network applications that read from and write to the disk (e.g. a query server that logs the queries of the clients, where the client sends a query and receives the results and the client's query is stored in the database).
Server Configuration
We implemented NoCrypto, Scheme1, Scheme2 and SchemeS* using C++ language and run a simulation to examine their practical behavior. Table 3 shows the server configuration. Note that NoCrypto does not perform any encryption or decryption functions, it is illustrated here to show the cryptographic overhead and in SchemeS* all the clients share the same cluster. 
Parameters
• α is the tested packet size, we chosen α to be either 40 or 1500 bytes. As the current packet sizes seem mostly bimodal at 40 and 1500 bytes (Greg, 1998; Sinha et al., 2007) .
• P is the number of packets sent by each client, we chose P equals to 10 in case α=1500 and P equals to 100 in case α=40. This is to reduce the cost of client setup and gives us a better understanding on how each scheme works.
• Z i is the current number of clients served by the server.
-We measured N, the maximum number of clients that the server can serve for Scheme1 (as Scheme1 can serve the minimum number of clients). -We construct the set Z = { Z i }, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 9 and Z i = (N ÷ 10) × (1 + i), here we divide N to ten equal intervals.
• F is a file of size 1 GB used to demonstrate the effect of disk operations.
The Scenarios
We constructed a multi-client/server TCP socket application to demonstrate the behavior of the schemes. The server and the clients are connected via a LAN (100 Mbps). The scenarios work as follows: 1. The server allocates 1 GB as a shared data pool. This pool hold the encrypted and decrypted data for all the client and is used to illustrate the effect of reading and writing to the RAM.
2. The server allocates the memory needed by the tested scheme to serve Z i clients, where for each client, the server allocates ( M+ β) bytes, where M is the number of bytes required by each client using the tested scheme to allocate the key material and β equals to 20 bytes (4 bytes as clients identification number and 16 bytes to hold the client's IV).
3. The server waits until 10 computers are connected, then send the start command to all the computers (each computer simulates Z i /10 clients). Note that each computer is served using a different thread, to illustrate the effect of multithreading.
4. As the computer receives the start command, it sends P packets to the server, each of size α.
5. In senario 1, when the server receives a packet:
(a) The packet is decrypted for client C i and encrypted to client C x , where i and x are positive random numbers less than Z i .
(b) The server sends the encrypted packet (from the previous step), to the computer that serves client C x .
6. In senario 2, when the server receives a packet:
(a) The packets is decrypted for client C i , where i is a positive random number less than Z i .
(b) A random record of size α is read from the file F. This record is encrypted for the client C i . This is to illustrate the disk read operation.
(c) The server send the encrypted packet (from the previous step), to the computer that sends the packet.
7. In senario 3, when the server receives a packet:
(a) The packets is decrypted for client C i , , where i is a positive random number less than Z i .
(b) The decrypted packet is encrypted and saved at a random location to a file F. This is to illustrate the disk write operation.
(c) The server sends the packet back to C i .
8. In senario 4, when the server receives a packet:
(b) The decrypted packet is saved at a random location to a file F. This is to illustrate the disk write operation.
(c) A random record of size α is read from the file F, this record is encrypted for the client C i . This is to illustrate the disk read operation.
(d) The server send the encrypted packet (from the previous step), to the computer that sends the packet.
9. When all the P packets are processed by the server and received by the computer, the computer starts to send P packets for the next client it simulates.
10. The average time τ (in milliseconds) for processing a packet of size α for Z i clients is reported (from the time the server starts to receive the incoming packet, till the time the server sends the outgoing packet).
11. Note that for all the scenarios, we assume that the incoming and outgoing packets are of the same size for simplicity.
The Simulation Results
• We constructed and measured a set σ = { σ i }, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 9, where σ i is the average time to process P packets using the examined scheme, when it process Z i clients, using different values of α.
• Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize the results of the simulation for the four scenarios, where we plotted the average value of σ for each scheme.
• Note that values in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are measured in milliseconds. 
Discussion of the Results
Case α=40
Scenario 1: The encryption overhead ranges from about 9% to 15%. SchemeS* is faster than Scheme1 with about 5%, as Scheme1 is more prone to cache misses and page faults (beacuse it uses more memory to hold the pre-computed expanded subkeys). Scheme2 possesses almost the same speed as Scheme1.
Scenario 2: The encryption overhead ranges from about 14% to 24%. SchemeS* possess almost the same speed as Scheme1 and they are faster than Scheme2 with about 8%.
Scenario 3: The encryption overhead ranges from about 14% to 26%. SchemeS* is faster than Scheme1 with about 2% and Scheme2 is the slowest scheme.
Scenario 4: The encryption overhead ranges from about 21% to 29%. SchemeS* is faster than Scheme1 with about 2% and Scheme2 is the slowest scheme.
In conclusion, in case of small packets (α= 40, which represents about 40% of the internet traffic (Sinha et al., 2007) ), SchemeS* is faster than Scheme1 and Scheme2.
Case α=1500
Scenario 1: The encryption overhead ranges from about 141% to 231%. SchemeS* is faster than Scheme1 with about 8%, as Scheme1 is more prone to cache misses and page faults (beacuse it uses more memory to hold the pre-computed expanded subkeys). Scheme2 is about 37% slower than SchemeS*.
Scenario 2: The encryption overhead ranges from about 136% to 235%. SchemeS* and Scheme1 possess almost the same speed, on the other hand Scheme2 is about 42% slower than them.
Scenario 3: The encryption overhead ranges from about 155% to 253%. SchemeS* and Scheme1 possess almost the same speed, on the other hand Scheme2 is about 38% slower than them.
Scenario 4: The encryption overhead ranges from about 124% to 216%. SchemeS* and Scheme1 possess almost the same speed, on the other hand Scheme2 is about 33% slower than them.
In conclusion, in case of large packets (α= 1500, which represents about 20% of the internet traffic (Sinha et al., 2007) ), SchemeS* and Scheme1 out-performs Scheme2. Note that the overhead of fetching the pre-computed expanded subkeys of Scheme1 is considered neglegted in case of large packets.
The Maximum Number of Clients
SchemeS* uses the least amount of memory to hold its key material, thus can serve the maximum number of concurrent clients (by using the same memory, SchemeS* can serve up to 14 times the maximum number of clients served by Scheme1 and up to 3 times the maximum number of clients served by Scheme2).
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS 6.1 Assumptions 1. The secondary key is a part of the secret key and not controlled by the attacker. 2. AES' key scheduling routine, produces a random expanded key. 3. AES is secure, when a random expanded key is used.
(a) Due to our second assumption, AES is secure.
(b) Note that all the non-linearity of the AES is offered by its fixed S-box (Daemen and Rijmen, 1998) , not from the key material.
Security of CBC
Birthday attacks on CBC mode remain possible even when the underlying block cipher is ideal (Bellare et al., 1997) , and CBC encryption becomes insecure once 2 64 (in case of AES) blocks have been encrypted, in the sense that at this point partial information about the message begins to leak, due to birthday attacks (Bellare et al., 1998) . Therefore, the server MUST generate a fresh key (random and unused key) before 2 64 blocks are encrypted with the same key for each client. We recommend to encrypt maximum 2 32 blocks for each client (which is sufficient to encrypt the largest possible IPv6 jumbogram (Borman et al., 1999) ), then generates a fresh key for that client, to avoid birthday attacks.
Security of AES
We assume that, the best attack known against AES is to try every possible 256-bits key (i.e., perform an exhaustive key search), this requires about 2 255 trails (when AES with 256-bits is used).
Security of AESS
For an attacker that does not know either the primary key and the secondary key, and she tries to attack a normal AES with some random independent subkeys, which is secure due to our third assumption. Notes:
1. The secondary key replaces the subkeys of fifth and tenth rounds of the AES (with 256-bits encryption key), to achieve full confusion and full diffusion in both the encryption and decryption directions, as AES requires only four rounds to achieve full bit confusion (or mixing) and diffusion (each input bit affecting each output bit) properties (May et al., 2002) .
2. This choice assures that any difference between two secondary keys, will be associated with full confusion and full diffusion in both the encryption and decryption directions.
Security of the Schemes
The security of Scheme1 and Scheme2 are inherited from the security of the CBC mode and that of the AES. As the attacker can either attack the mode of operation or the cipher itself. The security of SchemeS n is inherited from that of the CBC mode and that of AESS. As CBC mode security is not based on the used block cipher. There are two kinds of attackers on SchemeS, when attacking AESS:
1. An attacker A that watches the ciphertext. For an external attacker (that does not possess the primary key), it is hard to gain advantage, when the secondary keys do not share a common mathematical relation, to mount a related key attack.
2. An attacker B (which is a client of the server), that would like to attack another client within the same cluster. This attacker knows the primary key:
(a) The attacker encrypts the known plaintext with the known primary key until the 5 th round (without the AddRoundKey operation) to produce the intermediate state φ.
(b) The attacker decrypts the known ciphertext with the known primary key until 10 th round to produce the intermediate state γ.
(c) Now, the attacker has managed to reduce AESS to an Even-Mansour construction (Even and Mansour, 1997) , where K1 and K2 are the keys and the reduced AES (5 rounds) is considered as the (Pseudo)random permutation. Note that it was evident that the AES has a random profile after only 3 rounds (Soto and Bassham, 2000) .
(d) The security of Even-Mansour is:
i. About 2 255 , using exhaustive search over the key space (K1 and K2 are both of size 128-bits), which is considered large enough by todays standards. ii. Daemen demonstrated in (Daemen, 1991) that a known plaintext attack, will take on average 2 127 calculations, which has the same complexity as attacking AES with 128-bits key, which is considered secure with todays technology. iii. Daemen also demonstrated in (Daemen, 1991 ) that a chosen plaintext attack, will take on average 2 64 calculations using 2 64 stored blocks. By limiting the number of encrypted blocks per client, this attack can be avoided (see Section 6.2, as each client encrypts maximum 2 32 blocks using the same secondary key, if for some application more data is needed to be encrypted the client can join a new cluster "using a fresh secondary key" or new fresh secondary key can be generated for that client). iv. Biryukov-Wagner demonstrated in (Biryukov and Wagner, 2000) , that a "sliding with a twist" attack allows an adversary to recover the key using √ 2 × 2 64 known plaintexts and √ 2 × 2 64 work. By limiting the number of blocks encrypted per client using the same secondary key, this attack can be avoided (see Section 6.2).
The most powerful attacker is B, where an inside attacker attack a client in the same cluster. This happens with probability (n-1)/(N-1). So as n decreases and/or N increases, the probability of the existence of such attacker decreases. Even if attacker B exists, the complexity to mount Daemen's known plaintext attack is the same complexity to attack AES with 128-bits key, which is considered secure with todays technology. On the other hand, to limit the probability of the other attacks, the number of encrypted blocks per client (using the same secondary key) MUST NOT reach the 2 64 boundary. Therefore the server MUST generate a fresh key (for each client) before 2 64 blocks are encrypted with the same key. We recommend that the server encrypts maximum 2 32 blocks for each client, if for some application more data is needed to be encrypted the client can join a new cluster or new fresh secondary key can be generated for that client.
So SchemeS n is upper bounded with the security of AESS and lower bounded with the security of Even-Mansour.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel encryption scheme for high-speed networks. We analyzed our proposed scheme with the two most widely used schemes. Our analysis consists of theoretical and practical parts. This analysis illustrates that our proposed scheme is superior than the current schemes, by possessing high throughput, consuming the lowest amount of memory, serving the largest number of concurrent clients and it is also considered secure.
